

ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

# The Defense Department's UAP Mission & Civil Aviation

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All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office  
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U.S. Department of Defense &  
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AARO emerged from Congressional and Departmental recognition that UAP present complex hazards and threats across service, regional, and domain boundaries.



- What is the ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE (AARO)?
- What outcomes does AARO aim to produce?
- How will AARO resolve phenomena?
- How are AARO's mission responsibilities applicable to you?

Anomalous observation material, behavioral, or capability attributes perceived to be beyond known performance envelopes

## UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA

UAP are sources of anomalous spaceborne, airborne, seaborne, or transmedium observations that are not yet attributable to known actors or causes

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AARO is a uniquely-capable, Defense Department organization that integrates **operational, scientific, and intelligence** capabilities to resolve UAP.



### our mission

minimize technical and intelligence surprise, by synchronizing scientific, intelligence, and operational detection, identification, attribution, and mitigation of unidentified, anomalous objects in the vicinity of national security areas

### our vision

unidentified, anomalous objects are effectively and efficiently detected, tracked, analyzed, and managed by way of normalized DoD, IC, and civil business practices; by adherence to the highest scientific and intelligence-tradecraft standards; and with greater transparency and shared awareness

### key scientific and intelligence questions

- Physical, technical, behavioral, and contextual **characteristics** of phenomena, their composition, and their movement
- **Capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities** of phenomena and any assessed technological gap between phenomena and the United States
- Indications and characteristics of **hazards, risks** and/or **threats** by phenomena to the United States, its people, its equities, and/or its instruments of national power
- **Attribution** of phenomena to natural and/or artificial sources
- Indications of **foreign observation** of and reaction to phenomena
- The **disposition** of observed phenomena

The potentially **ubiquitous presence** of UAP defines the national-security implications and drives the **broad range of stakeholders** and demand for rigorous **scientific understanding** of and intelligence on phenomena

#### US Territory & Operating Areas

- DoD observations and reporting of UAP most often in the vicinity of US military facilities and operating areas
- Threats to the immediate safety of US citizens and Government facilities, across domains, is priority
- Safety and security risks of UAP heighten US Government awareness and drives research and mitigation efforts

#### US Strategic Capabilities

- Reporting on UAP proximity to strategic capabilities and critical infrastructure primarily historical; analysis limited by information currency and source reliability
- Consequence of UAP in the vicinity of strategic capabilities is high, potentially threatening strategic deterrence and safety of civil society
- DoD strengthening observations and reporting capabilities near US strategic capabilities and critical infrastructure
- Reporting on UAP activity in foreign territory or operating areas limited by source reliability
- Consequence of such moderate-to-high, potentially leading to adversarial misattribution of UAP to the United States
- Allies and strategic competitors apply resources to observe, identify, and attribute UAP [\(open source\)](#)

➤ Key partners and stakeholders include DoD, IC, DoJ, NASA, FAA

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➤ Key partners and stakeholders include DoD, IC, STATE, international partners



AARO leads integration of the Department's UAP **operations, research, analyses, and strategic-communications** to deliver exquisite data, advanced sensors, sound analytics, and shared mission awareness and ownership



synchronizing and sequencing Theater, IC, and other capabilities for optimized, cross-functional UAP detection, tracking, mitigation, and recovery

**Integrated-Operations**

revealing and exploiting elusive and enigmatic signatures through advanced technologies and focused, cross-sector partnerships

**S&T Research & Application**

delivering peer-reviewed conclusions through deliberate syntheses of scientific and intelligence method, tradecraft, tools, and expertise

**Interdisciplinary Analyses**

driving shared awareness across mission partners, oversight authorities, and stakeholders—normalizing cross-sector partnerships and building trust with transparency

**Focused Communications**

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# Our mission success and our ability to contribute to aviation safety depends on observations and insights from the aviation community

## Educate Aviators and Crews

The subject of UAP is laden with decades of imprecise—and often sensational—information

Promulgating accurate information about UAP, their implications to flight safety and national security, and our commitment to resolving them is foundational to our partnership with the community.

Sharing what UAP data is critically-important for scientific and intelligence analyses allows aviators and crews to optimize the value of their observations and reporting of phenomena

## Encourage Reporting

Historically, reticence to UAP reporting has limited the Government's ability to guard against aerial safety and security threats

Destigmatizing discussion *about* and reporting *of* UAP is essential for tracking, resolving, and defending against such phenomena

Government efforts to encourage military aviators and crews to report phenomena have substantially increased the quantity and quality of UAP data

## **Updating Civil Aviation Reporting Mechanism**

## Leverage Our Expertise & Systems

Aviators and crews informed about UAP and willing to report have historically had few official channels to submit observational data

We are working with military, civil, and industry partners to develop and field reporting mechanisms available to aviators and crews

By leveraging our systems, we will be able to quickly incorporate aviators' and crews' reporting into the corpus of data, to optimize scientific and intelligence analyses, and to provide feedback to the reporting individual and/or organization



# What kind of information would be necessary and sufficient for UAP analyses?



<u>about the phenomenon</u>	<u>about the observer</u>
— UAP-event description or narrative	— Observer's date, time, location, and travel path for first and last observation of the UAP, with as much precision as practicable
— UAP location relative to the observer, with as much precision as practicable	— Observer's behavior toward the UAP
— Number of UAP-objects observed during the phenomenon and indications of intra UAP-object coordination and/or communication	— Sensors that detected the phenomenon (e.g., visual, radar)
— Indications of advanced and/or enigmatic capabilities	— Any physiological, psychological, or other effects apparently corresponding to the UAP observation
	— Observer's assessment of the UAP, including the nature of the phenomenon and whether it was benign, a hazard, or a threat
	— Identification of any other observers



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