

STEVENSVILLE, MT.
May 11, 1995

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170 LUKE AVE SUITE 400
ROLLING AFB DC 20332


DEAR LT McANDREW

I HAVE LOOKED FOR PHOTOS OF THE DUMMIES WHICH YOU REQUESTED.
I KNOW THAT SOME WHERE IN THE GREAT VOID THERE IS A PHOTO OF A
STRING OF THEM READY TO DROP FROM A C-97 AT HOLLOMAN. I CAN'T
FIND IT AND AM SORRY TO FAIL YOU.

THE SCRAP BOOK HAS MANY THINGS BUT I SELECTED THIS LITTLE
BUNDLE ON THE OFF CHANCE ONE OR MORE MAY BE OF INTEREST.

YOU TRIGGERED MANY MEMORIES--THANK YOU!

SINCERELY



ED SPERRY
COL USAF (RET)

PS; JOIN MY LEGION POST. WE NEED TROOPS LIKE YOU AND WE DO MANY
GOOD THINGS FOR YOUTH.



On May Day, 1960, two weeks before President Eisenhower was to meet Nikita Khrushchev at a Paris summit, the CIA's Francis Gary Powers flew a U-2 spy plane deep into the Soviet Union and crashed. This mysterious event caused one of the most serious confrontations of the cold war and may have changed the course of history. Historian Michael R. Beschloss has written an important new book on the U-2 crisis. Here is the first of two exclusive excerpts from *Mayday*, a Main Selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club. The book draws on interviews with key Eisenhower and CIA officials as well as private diaries, letters and heretofore-secret documents. *Mayday* will be published by Harper & Row, Publishers, on May 1.

THE SPY FLIGHT THAT KILLED IKE'S DREAM

■ April 30, 1960. There was no premonition of disaster. On a tranquil Saturday like this, the President's day began in the First Lady's bedroom on the second floor of the White House, where the first beams of sunlight pushed through the floral draperies and fell across the sleeping man and woman.

In the absence of an urgent telephone call, Dwight David Eisenhower was awakened by his valet, a black sergeant named John Moaney who had laid out the General of the Army's clothes in Algiers, London, Frankfurt, New York and Paris. When Moaney knocked, the President usually cried, "O.K.!" and reached for a bathrobe, his cheeks pink and fringe of snowy hair ruffled from sleep. To avoid waking his wife, Eisenhower slipped into the adjoining President's bedroom, which he used for changing clothes and naps.

He ordinarily took his morning shower before stirring hot shaving foam in an old-fashioned mug and moving a safety razor up and down the most famous face in the Western World. In the spring of 1960, the image in the mirror looked firmer and graver than the face smiling from the "I LIKE IKE" banners of his first campaign, as if seven years in the White House had chastened and deepened him. But the actual reason was his diet.

Since his heart attack in 1955, the President had obeyed his doctor and forsworn the rich food he loved, to bring himself down to 173 pounds, his football weight at West Point in 1913. Stripped of the extra layer of fat, his features were at once more sensitive and more powerful. Years later, on first meeting Eisenhower, Henry Kissinger was not prepared for the "cold, deep-blue, extraordinarily penetrating eyes."

After he dressed and took breakfast, the President walked down the wide hall that served First Families as a private parlor and into the private elevator. Soon he entered his pale green Oval Office and sat down behind the rosewood desk.

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, his staff secre-



SECRET MISSIONS OF THE BLACK PLANES

In November, 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to spend \$35 million to build a high-flying spy plane that could cross the Soviet Union without being shot down. From July, 1956, through May Day, 1960, he secretly ordered and oversaw each of the three or four dozen missions on which Francis Gary Powers and other CIA pilots flew into Russia.

From the program's start, Eisenhower had been worried that the Russians might misinterpret a U-2 flight as the forerunner of an American military invasion. Time and time again, he told his aides that ordering a plane to pierce Soviet airspace in peacetime was "one of the most soul-searching questions to come before a President."

tary, walked in to deliver the morning intelligence briefing. He reminded the President of something so secret that it was known only to two other key members of the White House staff: In West Pakistan, a CIA pilot was waiting to fly for 9 hours to Norway across the forbidden territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.



















Eisenhower had always been reluctant to violate Soviet airspace. He privately noted that "if they were to do this to us," it might start a nuclear war. But by 1959, CIA deputy director Richard Bissell, father of the U-2 program, reported that the black planes were gathering a large percentage of "our hard intelligence information about the Soviet Union."

This spring, the President had been more reluctant than ever. Four years into the program, there was not only greater risk of downing, but, two weeks from now, Eisenhower was scheduled to meet Nikita Khrushchev at the summit in Paris along with the leaders of Britain and France. In June, Eisenhower would go to the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev was planning an extravagant welcome.

Negotiators for both sides had drawn close to reaching a limited nuclear-test-ban treaty, which, if signed, would be the first major accord of the cold war. Privately, Eisenhower told aides that he was "determined" to achieve it. Since becoming President in 1953, his chief aspiration had been to create a lasting improvement in American-Soviet relations. He told French President Charles de Gaulle, "What a splendid exit it would be for me to end up... with an agreement between East and West!"

Nevertheless, on April 9, 1960, the President had sent the U-2 back into Russia. Then the CIA asked for still another flight. Eisenhower

100 Sweepstakes

100 ft. 37  Electric Cord & Snow Blower	100 cu. ft. 38  Greenhouse	100 lbs. 39  Satellite Dish	100 40  Gallons of Gas	100 lbs. 41  Jelly Beans	100 42  Gambling Chips in Monte Carlo*	100 min. 43  In Hot Air Balloon
100 qts. 44  Chinese Food to go	100 45  Suits Dry Cleaned	100 lbs. 46  Smoked Salmon	100 47  Jars of Mustard in Dijon*	100 48  Live Lobsters	100 sq. in. 49  Stained Glass	100 50  Tennis Balls & Racquet
100 51  Spools Thread & Sewing Machine	100 52  Long Stem Roses	100 53  Fireplace Logs	100 sq. in. 54  Component Television	100 lbs. 55  Scuba Diving Equipment	100 56  Golf Balls & Bag of Irons	100 57  Roast Chickens & Picnic Basket
100 lbs. 58  Mesquite & Barbeque	100 lbs. 59  Paper & Word Processor	100 60  Movie Posters in Hollywood*	100 61  Assorted Pizzas	100 yds. 62  Chintz	100 boxes 63  Cake Mix & Food Processor	100 64  Tap Dancing Lessons
100 65  Thousand Feet of Pasta	100 66  Clams & Steamer	100 sq. in. 67  Igloo in Canada*	100 68  Bow Ties	100 69  Cones & Ice Cream Maker	100 70  Cassettes & VCR	100 71  Movie Tickets
100 72  Songs on a Player Piano	100 73  Frozen Dinners & Microwave	100 cu. ft. 74  Personal Sauna	100 in. 75  Exercise Machine	100 in. 76  Encyclopedia Set	100 77  Year-Old Grandfather Clock	100 lbs. 78  Chocolate Chip Cookies
100 lbs. 79  Spicy Meatballs	100 80  Tapes & Video Camera	100 yds. 81  Artificial Turf & Football	100 82  Cartons Benson & Hedges	100 83  Sirloin Steaks	100 in. 84  Sail Board	100 ozs. 85  Cajun Spices & Cookbook
100 in. 86  Mercury Sable	100 87  Days of Cable TV	100 88  Shares of Blue Chip Stock	100 89  Pairs of Sneakers	100 hrs. 90  Language Lessons	100 lbs. 91  Remote Control Robot	100 92  Bags of Chocolate Kisses
100 ozs. 93  Silver Fox Coat	100 94  Crackers & Wheel of Cheese	OFFICIAL RULES— NO PURCHASE NECESSARY 1. Write the number of the sweepstakes you wish to enter in the space provided on the official entry blank, or on a plain 3" x 5" piece of paper. 2. Hand print your name, address and zip code on your entry, include with it the bottom panels from two packs of Benson & Hedges 100's, Benson & Hedges Lights or Benson & Hedges Deluxe Ultra Lights, Regular or Menthol, or the words "BENSON & HEDGES 100 SWEEPSTAKES" hand printed on a plain piece of paper. 3. Enter as often as you wish, but you may enter only one sweepstakes per envelope. Each envelope must be mailed separately to: BENSON & HEDGES 100 SWEEPSTAKES, P.O. Box 3021, Syosset, N.Y. 11775. Entries must be received by July 31, 1986. 4. IMPORTANT: You must write the number of the sweepstakes you are entering on the outside of the envelope, in the lower left-hand corner. 5. Winners will be selected in random drawings conducted by National Judging Institute, Inc., an independent judging organization whose decisions are final. Winners will be asked to execute an affidavit of release and eligibility. All prizes will be awarded. One prize to a family. Tax liability is responsibility of individual winners. In lieu of prize, winner may elect to receive a cash award of \$200. No responsibility is assumed for lost, late or misdirected mail. 6. Sweepstakes open to U.S. residents over 21 years of age, as of March 1, 1986 except employees of PHILIP MORRIS INC., and their families, its advertising agencies, and DON JAGODA ASSOCIATES, INC. Subject to all federal, state and local laws. Void in Michigan and wherever else prohibited, restricted or taxed. 7. For a list of winners, send a stamped, self-addressed envelope to: Benson & Hedges Winners List, P.O. Box 3495, Syosset, N.Y. 11775.				
100 95  Gallons of House Paint	100 96  Fact Books & Trivia Game					
100 ozs. 97  Caviar & Bottle of Champagne	100 hrs. 98  In a Health Spa					
100 99  Jars Bubble Bath & Whirlpool	100 100  Hawaiian Shirts					

*Trip for two includes travel and hotel accommodations.

Benson & Hedges

America's Favorite 100 Sweepstakes

P.O. Box 3021, Syosset, New York 11775

I've read the rules carefully and chosen my favorite Sweepstakes:

The Sweepstakes number is _____

The prize is _____


Name _____ (Please Print)

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ I am a smoker, 21 or over and I am interested in a special coupon offer from Benson & Hedges.

Complete name of current brand _____





approved the mission but allowed only two weeks in which to fly: "We don't want that thing flying up there while the summit's on."

For two weeks, clouds and snowstorms concealed much of the route over the Soviet Union. Bissell pleaded for a few more days. Eisenhower agreed but specified that "no operation is to be carried out after May 1."

By this, the last day of April, the pilot and plane were still waiting in West Pakistan. If they could not fly tomorrow on May Day, there would be no mission at least until after the summit.

Saturday evening. Eisenhower joined his wife Mamie; his son John, who served as a Presidential aide; John's wife Barbara, and the four grandchildren for dinner at Camp David. After the meal, they watched "April Showers," starring Jack Carson and Ann Sothern, a sentimental tale made in 1948 about a vaudeville family's rise to Broadway.

As the 69-year-old President sat with his family in the darkened room, the changing brightness of the screen lighting their faces, he looked forward to nine final months in the White House that would be the capstone of his long career: A Soviet-American accord at Paris, the grand tour of Russia and, as he also expected, a Republican victory in November that would be a final ratification of his Presidency.

He could not know that these expectations largely rested on the fate of a young former Air Force lieutenant whose name he had never heard, who was tossing and turning on his cot in a noisy, steaming hangar in West Pakistan.

In South Asia, it was now Sunday, the first of May. Inside the pitch-dark hangar at Peshawar, 2 hours after midnight, Francis Gary Powers rose from his cot and braced himself for his mission—3,788 miles north to Bodo, Norway, bisecting the Soviet land mass at the Urals.

GAFFE LED TO COLD-WAR THAW

In the summer of 1959, President Eisenhower approved an invitation for Khrushchev to make the first U.S. visit of a supreme Soviet leader—if there was progress at East-West talks in Geneva. By mistake, the State Department invited Khrushchev unconditionally. When Khrushchev accepted, Eisenhower blew up: Now he must personally "pay the penalty" of a visit that would be "a most unpleasant experience."

But Khrushchev's visit that September had a positive impact. Henry Cabot Lodge, who escorted the Soviet leader, told the President that Khrushchev was "deeply impressed"



by American productive power: "He probably does not now really think the Soviets are likely to surpass us—at least anytime soon." After two private days with Eisenhower at Camp David, Khrushchev lifted an ultimatum on Berlin, announced that the President had "captivated" him and praised his wisdom and love of peace in terms no cold-war Soviet leader has used either before or since. The stage was set for a full-fledged negotiation at the summit in Paris.

While squeezing into his flight suit, he was asked, "Do you want the silver dollar?" It looked like an ordinary coin with a loop attached for fastening onto a key chain. But inside the two halves of the coin was a tiny pin loaded with a lethal shellfish toxin perfected by the CIA at a reported cost of \$3 million.

As Richard Bissell later said, the U-2 pilots were "exhorted but not ordered" to kill themselves if caught by the Russians. If a plane went down and a U-2 pilot was captured, he might well prefer suicide to torture. Powers accepted the coin and dropped it into the pocket of his flight suit.

The CIA did not think there was much chance that a U-2 pilot would survive a mishap. The plane was so fragile that it would probably break up under assault. An escaping pilot could not survive at high altitude. An explosive was stowed behind the U-2 pilot's seat before each flight into Russia. Each pilot was informed that in an emergency he must set off the bomb before using his ejection seat and parachute. Pilots were told that after flipping the two switches, they would have 70 seconds to leave the plane before the bomb exploded.

Some wondered whether the explosive really had a shorter delay. Some suspected that there was no delay, and that when they flipped the second switch, the bomb would obliterate not only the plane and equipment but them too.

At 5:20 a.m., with a package of Kents in his pocket, Powers was strapped into the scorching cockpit of his plane. To keep the U-2 from being traced to the U.S. government, the plane's black skin and the pilot's silver suit were both unmarked.

At 6:26 the signal came. He locked his plastic canopy from the inside. The ladder was pulled from his plane. He jerked the throttle. The engine screamed and the plane shot into the unforgettable parabola so steep that early U-2 pilots feared that their planes would overturn. To his east was China in the full brilliance of dawn; to the west, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East were emerging from the night.

In no time, he was soaring over 60,000 feet. His underwear was still soaked from the Peshawar heat, but now he shivered. He switched on the autopilot and wrote in his flight log, "Delayed one-half hour."

Sixty minutes into his mission, he neared the air frontier of the Soviet Union. The radio could not be used to let colleagues in Pakistan

THE U-2 CRISIS

know; that could alert the Russians. Instead he broadcasted two clicks. Peshawar sent back a single click: Proceed as planned.

Nikita Khrushchev was asleep. In the dark, workers in Moscow's Red Square were tacking up bunting and moving bleachers in preparation for the national celebration of May Day.

In Khrushchev's bedroom, the telephone rang. As he later recalled, at the other end of the line was his Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. An unidentified plane had crossed the Afghan frontier into Soviet airspace. Both men knew who had sent the plane.

Khrushchev was furious: Bad enough to invade Soviet airspace, but on a national holiday—and 15 days before the Paris summit! The plane must be shot down.

This was easier said than done. Both men knew that for nearly four years they had failed to strike the American intruder. But Malinovsky said he had already given the order: "If our antiaircraft units can just keep their eyes open and stop yawning long enough, I'm sure we'll knock the plane down."

Sealed inside his flight suit, a single soul over a ghostly and menacing land, Frank Powers gazed into the midnight-blue stratosphere that only a small brotherhood of pilots knew and switched his cameras on and off.

He swept on past the Aral Sea over the long route north to Chelyabinsk. At this instant, by his later recollection, the plane pitched nose-up; the autopilot had conked out. Soon it conked out again. If he proceeded, he would have to fly the airplane manually.

This could be treacherous: Should he turn back? By now he was roughly 1,300 miles inside Russia. He decided to "go on and accomplish what I had set out to do."

Next target was Sverdlovsk, which was defended by the Soviet Union's new SA-2 Guideline missiles. As Powers later said, he switched on cameras and other equipment, and turned 90 degrees, toward the southwestern edge of the city. Now he was more than halfway into his mission. In Washington, it was 1:53 on Sunday morning. Moscow time was 8:53 a.m.

He heard a dull "thump." The plane convulsed, and an orange flash lit the cockpit and sky. Knocked back in his seat, he cried, "My God, I've had it now!"

He seized the throttle with his left hand, keeping his right on the steering wheel. The aircraft's nose swung down; when he pulled on the wheel, he found that the plane had gone out of control. A violent movement shook the plane and flung him about the cockpit. Wings snapped off. With its nose to the heavens, the mangled fuselage spun toward earth.

The destructor switches. As he later recalled, he reached for them and then changed his mind; first he must position himself to

eject. Powers was so sprawled that he feared that during ejection his legs might be sheared off by the metal canopy rails overhead. Nevertheless, he forced both heels into the stirrups of his seat. But he could not force his shoulders back. He was on the edge of panic when he realized that he could simply climb out of the cockpit. He reached up and unfastened the canopy; it sailed into space.

He later testified that he was planning to throw the destructor switches when centrifugal force threw him halfway out of the cockpit. His face plate frosted over. Still tied to the plane by oxygen hoses, by his account, he tried to climb back into the cockpit to set off the destruction device. But the G-force, the gravitational force, was overpowering. Unable to thrust his hand under the windscreen to reach the switches, he later recalled thinking, "I've just got to try to save myself now." Kicking and squirming, he must have broken the hoses because suddenly he was free.

The orange-and-white parachute bloomed overhead. He flicked off his face plate, and fresh air blasted his lungs. Fragments of his plane fell past him. What about the silver dollar? He unscrewed the tiny loop, tossed away the two halves of the coin and slipped the pin into his pocket, just in case.

Plunging fast now, he dropped fatally close to electric-power lines as the earth rushed up to greet him and his head slammed hard against the denied territory of the Soviet Union.

In Red Square, soldiers, students, farmers, athletes marched past the frieze of Soviet leaders standing atop the Lenin-Stalin Tomb. Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, chief commander of Soviet antiaircraft forces, spoke into Khrushchev's ear: The intruder plane had been downed. The pilot had been captured alive and was being questioned. Khrushchev congratulated the Marshal on "this wonderful news."

Khrushchev's smile may have taxed his considerable dramatic skills, for this "wonderful news" was unlikely to help him. Despite Western references to the "absolute ruler of the Soviet Union," Khrushchev had actually almost been overthrown in 1957. Potential rivals remained, waiting for an opportunity.

Now, a fortnight before the summit he had sought for years, this pirate plane. And on May Day, no less!

Khrushchev knew that it would be almost impossible to conceal American wreckage and a live pilot, even if he wished. Once word spread through the party, the Army and the KGB, potential foes might seize the violation as evidence of how foolish Khrushchev had been, infatuated with Eisenhower and an Uncle Sam now revealed to be as warlike as ever. The "wonderful news," if not deftly managed, could throw Khrushchev into another struggle for his political life.

At the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, Allen

THE PILOT'S JAMES BOND KIT



Francis Gary Powers considered himself a pilot, not a spy, but the CIA supplied him with emergency equipment suitable for the best-prepared James Bond—not only the notorious suicide pin and destructor unit, but a hunting knife, a custom-made pistol with silencer, a life raft, clothing, water, food, a compass, signal flares, a first-aid kit, hunting gear and a large silk banner in 14 languages:

I BEAR NO MALICE TOWARD YOUR PEOPLE. IF YOU HELP ME, YOU WILL BE REWARDED.

The "rewards" included 7,500 rubles, ladies' rings and gold watches.

ПО АВАРИЙНОМУ СЛУЧАЮ
ПРЕДНАЗНАЧЕН ДЛЯ
ПИТАНИЯ И ЗАЩИТЫ
ПРИЛЖЕНОСТИ АТМОСФЕРЫ

HELMET
FROM PARTIAL PRESSURE
FOR OXYGEN SUPPLY
FROM LOW PRESSURE




THE MISSION

Flight plan: Cross U.S.S.R. from Pakistan to Norway—3,788 miles in 9 hours.

Goals: Spy on Tyuratam, the Soviets' Cape Canaveral, and Plesetsk, suspected site of Soviets' first ICBM's. (Months later, U.S. spy satellite confirmed missiles in place at Plesetsk.)

FOREIGN PARTNERS IN ESPIONAGE


CIA Director Allen Dulles once said that one thing he "never" discussed was the collaboration of friendly governments with the CIA. The U.S. secretly persuaded the leaders and intelligence officials of Norway, West Germany, Turkey, Pakistan and Japan to allow the U-2 to fly into Russia from their territory.




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All did so at high that while the Russia retaliate against the violation, they might weaker U.S. ally. The each government the flights were ever rev world, the U.S. would used its territory to v into Russia without p the U-2 fell on May Day, the promise was kept.

Dulles took Sunday breakfast with 2,500 members of the New York Police Department to be lauded for "distinguished government service and dedication to Christian ideals."

The CIA director did not know yet that the U-2 was down, but his people in Washington did. Professional eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency had followed the Powers plane as it soared up the Urals; from listening posts they heard the babble of frantic Soviet officers demanding its interception. CIA men at Bodo airfield in Norway flashed word to Washington that the plane was overdue.

Andrew Goodpaster was spending Sunday with his family in Alexandria when the CIA man called. Goodpaster called the President, who was skeet shooting at Camp David: "One of our reconnaissance planes on a scheduled flight is overdue and possibly lost"—the news Eisenhower had feared since the start of the U-2 program.

The President boarded his helicopter. As it flew toward the White House, he looked down on the farms and tract houses of the Maryland countryside. He had once told his aides that "if one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess."

It would be embarrassing for the United States to rebut Russian charges of aerial espionage, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that his government could plausibly deny that the U-2 pilot had deliberately violated Soviet airspace. The CIA and Joint Chiefs had assured him that it would be "impossible" for the Soviets to capture a live pilot.

Eisenhower's chopper landed on the south grounds of the White House at 4:26 p.m. At the same hour, in his prison cell in Moscow, Francis Gary Powers fell asleep for the night.

the rug or reveal it in a propaganda assault that would stir up Soviet and world opinion against the United States?

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

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All did so at high risk. They knew that while the Russians might not retaliate against the U.S. for an aerial violation, they might strike back at a weaker U.S. ally. The CIA promised each government that if the spy flights were ever revealed to the world, the U.S. would claim that it had used its territory to wage spy flights into Russia without permission. After the U-2 fell on May Day, this promise was kept.

Dulles took Sunday breakfast with 2,500 members of the New York Police Department to be lauded for "distinguished government service and dedication to Christian ideals."

The CIA director did not know yet that the U-2 was down, but his people in Washington did. Professional eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency had followed the Powers plane as it soared up the Urals; from listening posts they heard the babble of frantic Soviet officers demanding its interception. CIA men at Bodo airfield in Norway flashed word to Washington that the plane was overdue.

Andrew Goodpaster was spending Sunday with his family in Alexandria when the CIA man called. Goodpaster called the President, who was skeet shooting at Camp David: "One of our reconnaissance planes on a scheduled flight is overdue and possibly lost"—the news Eisenhower had feared since the start of the U-2 program.

The President boarded his helicopter. As it flew toward the White House, he looked down on the farms and tract houses of the Maryland countryside. He had once told his aides that "if one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess."

It would be embarrassing for the United States to rebut Russian charges of aerial espionage, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that his government could plausibly deny that the U-2 pilot had deliberately violated Soviet airspace. The CIA and Joint Chiefs had assured him that it would be "impossible" for the Soviets to capture a live pilot.

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Monday morning, May 2. Andrew Goodpaster went to the Oval Office and told the President that the U-2 pilot was still missing. A CIA man had brought over the agreed-upon draft of the cover story. It would say that a U-2 weather pilot in Turkey had been lost after reporting oxygen problems by radio.

The President read the document. For years, some of his lieutenants would deny that he had ever read or approved it. But, in fact, he nodded assent and handed the sheet back to Goodpaster for distribution by NASA.

At the CIA, a colleague heard Richard Bissell assure Allen Dulles and other top officials that it was "impossible" for the U-2 pilot to have survived a crash.

Wednesday, May 4. In Moscow, members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party wrangled in secret over how to handle the downing of the American plane.

For days, Khrushchev had been pondering his decision: Should he sweep the U-2 under

the rug or reveal it in a propaganda assault that would stir up Soviet and world opinion against the United States?

If he swept the matter under the rug, the Paris summit and Eisenhower's trip to Russia might proceed. But this would give Khrushchev's enemies a powerful weapon. They would argue that Khrushchev was so timid that he was willing to tolerate even such a grave infraction.

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After 3 hours, he turned to the world scene: "As you know, on May 16, a meeting will take place in Paris involving the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France." Success was "essential if a solid basis is to be laid for peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."

But there was cause for alarm. "Comrade deputies! On the instructions of the Soviet government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet Union in the past few weeks by the United States of America.

"The United States has been sending aircraft that have crossed our state frontiers and intruded upon the airspace of the Soviet Union." The U.S. had sent such a plane on April 9, 1960. "The American military apparently found this impunity to their liking and decided to repeat their aggressive act. The day they chose for this was the most festive day for the working peoples of all countries—May Day!

"On this day, early in the morning, at 5:36 Moscow time, an American plane crossed our frontier and continued its flight deep into Soviet territory. . . . The plane was shot down." Earsplitting applause from the audience. He twisted his neck to glare up at U.S. Ambassa-

dor Llewellyn Thompson: "What was this? A *May Day* greeting?" Delegates whooped and stamped their feet.

"The question then arises: Who *sent* this aircraft across the Soviet frontier? Was it the American Commander in Chief who, as everyone knows, is the President? Or was this aggressive act performed by Pentagon militarists without the President's knowledge?" Khrushchev charged that "American aggressive circles" were trying to "torpedo the Paris summit or, at any rate, prevent an agreement for which the whole world is waiting."

Now he capped off the outrage he had so artfully whipped up. "We address the American people: In spite of these aggressive acts against our country, we have not forgotten the friendly encounters we had during our visit to America. Even now, I profoundly believe that the American people—except for certain imperialist and monopolist circles—want peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. . . . I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace."

In Washington, it was 7 o'clock on Thursday morning. Members and staff of the National Security Council were rushing to helicopter pads in the District, Maryland and Virginia, part of a long-planned Domsday rehearsal for the day Washington was destroyed by nuclear attack. They flew to High Point, a top-secret command post in Virginia's Blue Ridge.

There, two men gave a history of Soviet and American long-range missiles. As they spoke, Goodpaster was called to a secure telephone to talk to James Hagerty, the President's press secretary. Hagerty asked about Khrushchev's allegations; the White House press was already breaking down his door. What should he tell them? Goodpaster had a quiet word with the President and told Hagerty to stand by.

Eisenhower asked senior officials of State, Defense and CIA to join him in an adjoining lounge. Someone said they must refute Khrushchev's charges at once. The President disagreed; NASA's release had said enough. But others complained that silence might be taken as tacit admission that Khrushchev's charges were true. Eisenhower relented and asked Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon to draft a statement.

At 11:23, he returned to the White House. Hagerty walked into the Oval Office and crisply told Eisenhower and Goodpaster that Khrushchev's charges were such a major story that the President must speak to the press at once.


This raised Goodpaster's hackles: If the American government was going to hand out a deliberate lie, he wanted the President kept as far away from it as possible. But Goodpaster was handicapped from fully making his case; the U-2 was so secret that Hagerty was not cleared to know. Even at this crucial moment, as Goodpaster later recalled, he and Eisenhower did not tell him everything about the real



TRUMAN, MACMILLAN O.K.'d SPY FLIGHTS, TOO

It was not President Eisenhower but Harry Truman who started U.S. spy flights into the Soviet Union—in 1950. According to the late Gen. Nathan Twining, Truman asked Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg "why in the devil" he hadn't been doing it before.

Neither the U.S. or Britain ever admitted that the U-2 flights into Russia were a joint Anglo-American operation. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had the same power as Eisenhower to order a mission. His U-2 missions were flown by Royal Air Force pilots using American planes.



IKE FORESAW UPROAR

When the Russians put the U-2 debris on display at Gorky Park and Khrushchev denounced the U.S., Eisenhower was not surprised.

In February, he had told his Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities that "if one of these aircraft were lost when we were engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin my effectiveness." He said that with the Paris summit ahead, it was essential not to "dissipate" his reputation for honesty—especially since "the embarrassment will be so great if one crashes."

mission of this flight. Hence, Hagerty persisted in arguing that the President be involved as much as possible with this story.

Eisenhower refused to meet the press but agreed to have both the State Department and NASA issue statements on the U-2.

On the fifth floor of the State Department, Douglas Dillon pressed the telephone receiver to his ear and scrawled on a pad. At the other end of the line was Allen Dulles at the CIA.

The two men felt that the less said, the better. When they finished writing, Dillon gave the finished draft to Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman. At 12:45 p.m., White met reporters and read it aloud:

"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, a U-2 weather-research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May 1. . . . Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane."

During the past two days, Richard Bissell had given NASA detailed cover information on the U-2 in question-and-answer form. Now Goodpaster called NASA's administrator, T. Keith Glennan: NASA should put some of Bissell's material in a written memorandum. Goodpaster thought a written statement by NASA would be better than "turning the press loose on them."

NASA spokesman Walter Bonney worked Bissell's material into a statement. At 1:30 he met the press. Dreading the prospect of lying to reporters who liked and trusted him, he drew a deep breath and read aloud:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 Sunday morning, local time, when the pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area." Planned route: 1,400 nautical miles. Flight time: 3 hours, 45 minutes. Pilot was last heard from flying northeast. Maximum altitude: 45,000 feet. Mission's purpose: Gathering information on "clear-air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, the jet stream and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons." Bonney continued with detail after detail.

When Douglas Dillon read the NASA announcement, he was appalled. He had known that NASA would be issuing a more detailed statement but had not expected that the statement would include so much information that the Russians could disprove: "This statement was absolutely crazy because we *knew* the Russians would jump on it."

It was Thursday evening in Moscow. Ambassador Thompson was attending an Ethio-

pian Embassy reception at the Sovietskaya Hotel. Within his earshot, the Swedish ambassador asked Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik under which article of the U.N. Charter the Soviets would raise the plane incident.

Malik said they didn't know yet: They were still questioning the pilot.

Still questioning the pilot? Thompson rushed back to his embassy and sent a "MOST URGENT" cable to Dillon in Washington.

Malik's slip of the tongue was the first concrete indication that the Russians might have captured the U-2 pilot alive. Had Thompson's cable reached Washington in time, it might have kept the Americans from releasing the NASA statement that could be so damningly contradicted by a live U-2 pilot. But the cable arrived at 1:34 p.m.—4 minutes after Walter Bonney began reading his statement at NASA.

After sending his alert to Washington,



Thompson sent another cable to dissuade colleagues at home from concluding that Khrushchev had given up on the Paris summit:

AS I LISTENED TO HIS REMARKS ON THE PLANE INCIDENT, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THEY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER NOT—REPEAT NOT—TO SLAM ANY DOORS.

That evening, John Eisenhower called his mother and asked how his father liked the news about the U-2. The President barked, "Do you think I *ought* to like it?"

The next day, Dulles and Bissell wanted Eisenhower to confide "at least partly" in congressional leaders about the U-2, but he refused: "These congressional fellows will inevitably spill the beans."

Saturday, May 7. In Moscow, Khrushchev arrived to wind up the meeting of the Supreme Soviet: "Comrade deputies! The aggressive act committed by the U.S. Air Force

POWERS GRILLED ON SUMMIT SABOTAGE

Within hours after his capture at Sverdlovsk, Francis Gary Powers was flown to Moscow and taken to the infamous Lubyanka Prison. There, he was besieged by angry military and intelligence officers who demanded to know why he had really flown into the Soviet Union.

The U-2 pilot noticed that his poison pin had been taken out of the room. His situation was dire enough without adding a murder. He warned his captors about the pin. Later the Russians used it to inject a dog, which died in 90 seconds.

That night, Powers was taken to his cell. The steel-and-oak door was

against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet people." With a smirk, he read out the most tantalizing portions of the State Department and NASA announcements. Then he dropped his bombshell:

"Comrades, I must let you in on a secret. When I made my report two days ago, I deliberately refrained from mentioning that we have the remnants of the plane—and we also have the pilot, who is quite alive and kicking!"

Thunderous applause and laughter.

"Just look how many silly things they have said: Lake Van, scientific research and so on. Now when they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have to think up something else. And they will!"

Hoots and more laughter. "First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the downed American plane is alive and in good health.

slammed shut. A naked light bulb burned overhead, and he could not sleep. Thus far, he had survived his ordeal, but one line of questioning had thrown him slightly off balance: "Why was this flight flown so close to the summit meeting? Was this a deliberate attempt to sabotage the talks?"

In August, 1960, the Soviets put Powers on center stage in Moscow's Hall of Columns for their most flamboyant show trial of the cold war. Through months of interrogation, the pilot had withheld vital information and refused Soviet demands to denounce his own government.

But his fellow Americans did not know that. For the rest of his life, he would be haunted by his courtroom plea that he was "deeply repentant and profoundly sorry" for flying into Russia on May Day.

He is now in Moscow. The pilot's name is Francis Gary Powers."

Khrushchev reported that Powers had testified that he had had "no dizziness" or faulty oxygen equipment. Following orders, he had been flying along an assigned route, switching on and off his apparatus for spying on the Soviet Union "until the very moment his pirate flight into this country was cut short."

Khrushchev pulled out large copies of aerial photographs and waved them. "Here are some of the pictures showing military airfields. Here—look at this! Here are the airfields—here! Fighters in position on the ground. Two little white strips. Here they are! Here they are!" More thunderous applause.

(The "U-2 photographs" Khrushchev held up were counterfeit. Having halted the mission, he was unwilling to allow even a small sample of its intelligence product to reach Washington.)

Khrushchev revealed that the pilot had also carried two gold watches and seven gold ladies' rings: "Perhaps he was supposed to have

Congratulations. It's a Honda.



Family and friends will say the nicest things when your 1986 Honda Civic 4-Door family Sedan is delivered.

After all, the front-wheel-drive Civic is an attractive car. Its beauty also is functional. The shape is aerodynamic. The car seats five, comfortably. And

the trunk is very spacious.

Of course, while the Civic 4-Door was conceived as an economy car, it will cradle you in comfort. The front seats recline. The steering column is adjustable. And the transmission choices include a four-speed automatic.

Children, too, are treated with kid gloves. Standard features include child-proof rear door locks and child safety-seat anchors. Other pampering amenities are a quartz digital clock, tachometer, and remote trunk release.

But to those who say, "You're so

lucky," just smile knowingly. Luck had little to do with all this. It was planned. By Honda.

HONDA

The Civic 4-Door Sedan

flown still higher, to Mars, and seduced the Martian ladies!" More laughter, and then the fun was over:

"From the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: *Do not play with fire, gentlemen!* . . .

"I remember the talks I had with Americans. They impressed me very much. I still believe that those who met me want peace and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But apparently the Pentagon militarists and their monopolist allies cannot halt their war efforts."

Once again Khrushchev divorced this military clique from Eisenhower: "I am quite willing to grant that the President knew nothing about the fact that such a plane was sent into the Soviet Union. . . . But this should put us even more on guard."

"When the military starts bossing the show, the results can be disastrous. Such a pirate, prone to dizziness, may in fact drop a hydrogen bomb on foreign soil. And this means that the peoples of the land where this pirate was born will unavoidably and immediately get a more destructive hydrogen bomb in return!"

From Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington:

KHRUSHCHEV HAS HIMSELF STATED THE DILEMMA WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED. SHOULD WE DENY THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ACTION?

Andrew Goodpaster called John Eisenhower at Gettysburg, where the President's son and his family lived a mile from the President's weekend and soon-to-be retirement home: "They've got the pilot alive."

John climbed into his car and drove to the rambling white house his parents had built over the frame of an old red farmhouse. He found his father standing in the glassed-in porch in the rear, looking out on the lime-green Civil War battlegrounds he cherished.

The President's reaction to the news: "*Unbelievable.*" Now he knew that Khrushchev had irrefutable evidence that his administration had deliberately violated Soviet airspace, spied on the Soviet Union and several times lied about it to the world.

There must be some response to Khrushchev's speech—especially Khrushchev's "willingness to grant" that the CIA and Pentagon had sent the U-2 into Russia without the President's knowledge. Evidently Khrushchev was offering him an escape hatch. If Eisenhower used it, maintaining this fiction, then the Paris summit might proceed.

But this would create other problems. What would the world think if the American President had so little control over his own government that minions could, without his knowledge, send planes into Russia that might conceivably start a war? And the escape hatch

might turn out to be a trap: If Eisenhower shirked responsibility for the U-2, Khrushchev might then produce new evidence revealing the President personally to have lied.

Thus, he had the choice of presenting himself as a leader whose government was capable of accidental provocation—or declaring in public that he was the man behind the U-2, the first time in history that an American President confessed that his government practiced espionage.

Repeatedly assured that he would never face such a dilemma, Eisenhower could fairly wonder how "this goddamned plane" had fallen in Russia and the pilot survived. Now he faced leaving the White House in the wake of perhaps the bitterest disappointment of his life, as if the gods who had always looked so kindly on him had suddenly decided to exact a price for their gifts of the past.

Tomorrow was the 15th anniversary of victory in Europe.

In Washington, Allen Dulles privately offered his resignation: The President could tell the world that his CIA director had been fired for exceeding his authority.

"That's the last thing the President would want," said Andrew Goodpaster. "The President isn't in the business of using scapegoats."

Secretary of State Christian Herter had just returned from Europe. Now that they knew the espionage equipment and U-2 pilot had survived the crash, "we had to make a decision," as Herter later said. "Were we going to keep on lying about this, or were we going to tell the truth?"


Herter suggested a statement that was half true, half false. It would admit that the United States had flown espionage missions for four years along the Soviet border and that a U-2 had "probably" flown into Soviet airspace, but deny that the incursion had been authorized in Washington. This might give Khrushchev the satisfaction he seemed to be asking for and still protect the President.

Informed at Gettysburg, Eisenhower thought this "might prove to be a mistake" but agreed that it was "worth a try." Shortly after 6 p.m., Lincoln White read the new statement to reporters at the State Department.

Sunday, May 8. The Sunday morning papers evinced astonishment and indignation. In the *New York Herald Tribune*, Walter Lippmann wrote, "Denying that it authorized the flight, the administration has entered a plea of incompetence."

At Gettysburg, Eisenhower was rebelling against the new statement. It galled him to keep silent while Khrushchev presented a "passionate but highly distorted presentation of one particular phase of international espionage."

He was not priggish about lying for his country. But Khrushchev might go on television again to raise irrefutable evidence that the



IKE WAS READY TO SPY WITH "AIR FORCE ONE"

In preparation for Eisenhower's planned trip to Russia in June, 1960, spying equipment was secretly mounted aboard "Air Force One."

In the fall of 1959, Eisenhower wrote Khrushchev asking to use his own plane inside Russia. Khrushchev told Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson that the Soviet military feared "Air Force One" might have "secret means of photographing Soviet territory." Thompson promised to allow a Soviet navigator to ride in the cockpit. Khrushchev wrote Eisenhower that he had

DID SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER PERJURE HIMSELF?

In May and June, 1960, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigated the U-2 affair behind closed doors. Richard Helms, later CIA director (1966-73), attended the hearings as a CIA censor. In an interview with Beschloss quoted in *Mayday*, Helms charged that Secretary of State Christian Herter and other witnesses perjured themselves.


Helms said: "They were all sworn. Knowing what they knew and what actually went on, if it isn't perjury, I don't understand the meaning of the word. And I'm not against it. I'm simply saying that it's not the first time officials have perjured themselves in the interest of protecting a President."

In 1977, Helms was himself convicted of perjury for lying to the same committee about CIA efforts to mount a Chilean military coup.

The full transcript of the secret U-2 hearings has only recently been unsealed. It shows that when Chairman J. William Fulbright asked whether there was "ever a time"

"finally" overcome his generals' objections.

An air valve in the cockpit was evidently rigged to secretly turn spy equipment on and off. In an interview quoted in *Mayday*, CIA deputy director Richard Bissell told Beschloss, "I think Ike would have taken the position, 'All right, if you can put some equipment on my aircraft unobtrusively and take what you get, that's all right.' But I think he would have drawn the line at not altering the flight path in any shape or manner. . . . It would have been very unwise to let it be thought that his trip was being made or in any sense conditioned by intelligence."



when Eisenhower approved each U-2 flight, Herter replied, "It has never come up to the President."

But, in fact, since the start of the program, Eisenhower had approved the flights personally. Route maps were spread across his desk as a CIA man explained to him and the Secretary of State why national security depended on a new mission into Russia. After a flight, U-2 photographs were often brought to the White House for viewing by the President.

President had indeed authorized the May Day mission. Some reporter might exploit a leak from someone who knew that the President had approved every single U-2 flight. Then Eisenhower's credibility would be lost forever.

His entire training suggested that the man at the top should take full responsibility. When Milton Eisenhower told his brother that he must not take the rap for the U-2, the President snapped that if he blamed a subordinate, he would have to fire him and he would not "be guilty of such hypocrisy." Not only would this be a "glaring and permanent injustice," but it would confirm that the President was not in control of his own government. People around the world would fear that a low-level U.S. officer could start World War III.

The President called Herter and told him to issue a new statement admitting that for four years the U-2 had been sent under a broad presidential order to get "adequate knowledge" of the Soviet military-industrial complex and protect the nation from surprise attack.

He was still not ready to tell the full truth. The statement should say that while the President knew that sometimes "unusual and unorthodox" means were required to do this, he had not been given the details of reconnaissance missions. He wanted "no specific tie" of the May Day flight to him.

Monday, May 9. In Moscow, at a Czech Embassy reception, Khrushchev denounced the State Department's Saturday-night statement: "Here is how they explain the spy-plane affair—it is impossible to *admit* but impossible to *deny*. It's like the famous anecdote about the spinster who isn't a spinster because she has a baby!" All laughed.

He said he did not want to "heat up passions" against the U.S. He swung his open hand in the direction of Llewellyn Thompson: "I respect the U.S. ambassador and am sure that he had nothing to do with this incursion."

Before Khrushchev left the party, he told Thompson, "I must talk with you," and took him into a side room. When the door closed, as Thompson recalled, Khrushchev said, "*This U-2 thing has put me in a terrible spot. You have to get me off it.*"

Thompson pledged to do everything he could. But in Washington, the State Department made the announcement in Christian Herter's name that Eisenhower had personally authorized the U-2 flights. The statement implied that there might be more.

In Moscow, Khrushchev read this newest statement and he was apoplectic. He had gone out of his way not to accuse the President of sending the U-2 on May Day. Now this statement seemed "as though Eisenhower was boasting arrogantly about what the United States could do and would do."

Wednesday, May 11. At Gorky Park in Moscow, the Russians put the U-2's remains

on display in a carnival of agitprop. At 4 o'clock, a black Chaika limousine pulled up. Khrushchev bounced out and bustled about the hall, examining the noiseless pistol, ejection seat and destructor unit.

A reporter asked whether the newest American statement changed Khrushchev's opinion of the President. "It has, of course. I was not aware that this plan was not the caprice of an irresponsible officer. I was *horrified* to learn that the President had endorsed the acts." Khrushchev spared Eisenhower but lambasted Herter. Shaking his fist, he cried, "Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he *justifies* them and says they will continue in the future! Only countries which are at war with each other can act this way!"

"Do you still want President Eisenhower to come to the Soviet Union?"

Khrushchev knitted his brow for 15 seconds: "What do you want me to say? Come up here and say it for me. . . . You know my attitude toward the President. I have often spoken about it. I am a human being, and I have human feelings. I had hopes and they were betrayed. . . . So how can I now ask our people to turn out and welcome the dear guest who is coming to us? They will say, 'Are you nuts? What kind of a dear guest allows a plane to fly over us to spy?'"

"Wouldn't you prefer President Eisenhower's visit to be postponed?"

"I do not want to answer this question in front of you journalists. I will discuss this with the President in Paris. We still want to find ways to improve relations with the U.S.A."

At that very hour in Washington, the President held his Wednesday press conference. He had not yet seen the text of Khrushchev's comments at Gorky Park. Donning his spectacles, he read out a declaration that the Russians had inflated the U-2 incident beyond all proportion.


Thursday, May 12. Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington that Khrushchev's Gorky Park fulminations sounded as if the cold war was on again:

ALL SIGNS NOW APPEAR TO POINT TO KHRUSHCHEV'S INTENTION OF TRYING TO EXTORT MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FROM THE SUMMIT RATHER THAN ATTEMPT A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

That afternoon, Goodpaster brought Thompson's message to the Oval Office. The President read it, put on spiked shoes and whacked out golf balls on the south grounds of the White House. Then, as his secretary noted, he departed for the family quarters, "nervous, tense, said his blood pressure was high."

His showdown with Khrushchev in Paris was four days ahead.

Next week: The nightmare summit




STRIP A DAIQUIRI.


ONCE YOU SEE A DAIQUIRI NAKED, YOU MAY DISCOVER A NEW RESPECT FOR RUM. FOR YEARS PEOPLE THOUGHT RUM NEEDED TO BE DRESSED UP IN FANCY MIXES AND TASTY FRUITS. BUT NOW RUM IS BEING APPRECIATED FOR ITS DIGNITY AND ITS CHARACTER. THAT IS, IF IT'S RUM FROM PUERTO RICO. RUMS FROM PUERTO RICO ARE TREATED WITH RESPECT. AS ANY GREAT SPIRIT IS. THAT'S BECAUSE IN PUERTO RICO, ALL RUMS ARE AGED BY LAW FOR SMOOTHNESS, MELLOWNESS, AND MATURITY THAT STANDS UP, UNEMBELLISHED, TO THE MOST DISCRIMINATING TASTE. ENJOY RUMS OF PUERTO RICO STRAIGHT. ON THE ROCKS. WITH TONIC OR SODA. AND EXPOSE THE SPIRIT YOU'VE ALWAYS ENJOYED UNDERNEATH IT ALL.

**FIND THE SPIRIT YOU'VE
BEEN LOOKING FOR.**

RUMS OF PUERTO RICO



Here is the second and final excerpt from *Mayday*, the dramatic new book on the U-2 crisis by historian Michael R. Beschloss. Last week's excerpt revealed President Eisenhower's astonishment when the CIA's U-2 spy pilot Francis Gary Powers crashed deep in the Soviet Union on May Day, 1960—and survived. This paved the way for a major cold-war confrontation with Nikita Khrushchev in Paris. *Mayday* will be published by Harper & Row, Publishers, on May 1.



DOD

IKE'S NIGHTMARE SUMMIT AT PARIS

■ Saturday, May 14, 1960. Before dusk "Air Force One" took off for Paris and the encounter with Nikita Khrushchev. Sometimes Eisenhower dozed, sometimes he read, sometimes he stared at the stars as the aircraft moved into night over the North Atlantic.

It had been 13 days since he learned that Francis Gary Powers had crashed at Sverdlovsk, a week since he learned that the pilot had been captured alive. In their attempt to preserve relations with Moscow and protect the U.S. government from embarrassment, high American officials had concealed the fact that the President had personally sent this plane into the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, for the duration of the affair, the public would hear no untruths from Eisenhower.

Since May Day he had maintained an almost supernatural composure—except for an epithet or two spoken through clenched teeth and the moment he told his secretary, "I would like to resign." On this flight to Paris there was a break in his stoicism.

John Eisenhower came to the presidential cabin. He loved his father and had been stung by the public criticism about the U-2. His anger focused on Allen Dulles. John reminded his father that the CIA director had promised that a pilot would never be captured alive: "You ought to fire him."

This provoked a Vesuvian explosion. The President cried, "I am *not* going to shift the blame to my underlings!" The outburst suggested to John that "Dad was fighting a hard battle himself internally about Dulles" and "would like to have canned him."

This was not far from the mark. The President told his aide Andrew Goodpaster that he never wanted to see Dulles alone again.

Monday, May 16. "One of the things I had forgotten about Paris is the amount of noise caused by the traffic in the streets," the President's son wrote in his diary. "At times during the day this seems rather a pleasant



A PLAN TO BUG KHRUSHCHEV

Vernon Walters (between de Gaulle and Eisenhower, above) now serves President Reagan as Ambassador to the United Nations. In May, 1960, he went to Paris as an aide and interpreter under Eisenhower. Before the ill-starred summit began, a man Walters describes as "a very senior U.S. official" asked him to carry an eavesdropping device into the meeting room at the Elysée Palace.

Walters refused. He said that he would not bug the summit chamber unless specifically ordered to do so by President Eisenhower. Not only were the French skilled at detecting such devices, but President de Gaulle had been of great help to the United States government during the U-2 crisis and would be "furious" if he learned that his American allies had hidden a microphone in the room without his knowledge.

sound—but not at 5:15 in the morning with the grinding of gears from the trucks."

The day of the long-awaited summit conference was here.

Harold Macmillan had scarcely slept. Deploping the uncivilized hour, the British Prime Minister went to the official American residence for breakfast at 8 o'clock. He later wrote in his diary: "I thought Ike depressed and uncertain. The conversation was rather strained. I made it clear that we stood absolutely together. . . . Ike seemed to cheer up at this but still didn't know what to do."

More bad news: Khrushchev had sent word that the four leaders should not meet alone with translators, as planned, but with advisers. Before the limousines departed for the Elysée Palace, Secretary of State Christian Herter cabled Washington:

MOUNTING EVIDENCE SUGGESTS
SOVIETS INTEND WRECK CONFERENCE
AT OPENING SESSION ON U-2 ISSUE.
PLEASE INFORM VICE PRESIDENT.


At the palace President Charles de Gaulle took Khrushchev and his colleagues up the grand stairway to the small green-and-gold chamber once used by Louis XV and his mistress for intimate dining. Three minutes later de Gaulle brought in the British. Three minutes after that, the Americans. Eisenhower and his party merely nodded to Khrushchev and the Russians, who muttered among themselves like the opposite side in a divorce hearing.

Twenty-four men took their places. At 11:01 a.m. the doors behind the French President swung closed. He said: "Yesterday I received a statement from one of the participants, Mr. Khrushchev, which I conveyed verbally to the other participants—President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan. Does anyone therefore wish to say anything?"

"*Da!*" cried Khrushchev, springing to his feet. "I would like the floor."

"I would also like to make a short statement," said Eisenhower.

De Gaulle ruled that as a chief of state and



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
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


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
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
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
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
Insight by Layered, accounting.




Microsoft Word, word processing.




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government Eisenhower should be first to be heard, but Khrushchev objected: "I was the first to ask for the floor." De Gaulle raised his eyebrows. Eisenhower nodded.

Khrushchev put on his rimless glasses. The hand holding his papers trembled. For 45 minutes he read indignantly aloud, inveighing against the "aggressive" May Day flight, the earlier incursions and what he called Eisenhower's avowal that U-2 flights "remain the calculated policy of the United States."

Eisenhower ground his teeth; his bald head and neck turned an angry shade of pink, and he scrawled a note to Herter: "I am going to take up smoking again." Charles Bohlen of the State Department hissed, "We can't sit still for this." De Gaulle affected polite boredom. When Khrushchev bellowed too loudly he said, "The acoustics in this room are excellent. We can all hear the chairman."

Khrushchev glared back over his spectacles

ALARM ABOUT A PENTAGON COUP

Just hours before Eisenhower and Khrushchev sat down at the summit table, U.S. Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates concluded that the Soviet leader was about to break up the meeting and renew the cold war.

From his command post in Paris, after consulting the President, Gates decreed a worldwide U.S. military alert. Soldiers, sailors and airmen manned their stations. The unexpected alert shocked American reporters, who besieged the Pentagon demanding to know whether generals were trying to seize power while civilian leaders were out of Washington.



and pressed on: "How is it possible to productively negotiate . . . when the U.S. government and the President himself have not only failed to condemn this provocative act . . . but declared that such acts will *continue*?" Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet Defense Minister, grimaced and nodded furiously.

"We want to participate in the talks on an equal footing—and that is only possible if the United States declares that it will not violate Soviet borders, that it deplors the acts undertaken in the past and will punish those directly guilty of such actions." Evidently the current U.S. government did not see "that there is no other way but peaceful coexistence." Thus they should "postpone this conference for about six to eight months." By then Eisenhower would no longer be President.

"I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I am deeply convinced that all levels of American society do not want war. The exception is just a small, frantic group in the Pentagon and militarist circles who benefit from the arms race and reap huge profits."

He thanked de Gaulle and Macmillan for helping to arrange the summit. "We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the re-

'I THOUGHT THE PILOT WOULD DIE'

In August, 1964, while completing his memoirs, former President Eisenhower telephoned CIA Director John McCone to resolve questions about the U-2 affair. From a never-before-released CIA transcript:

Eisenhower: As I understood it . . . there was really no fear of ever getting back a live pilot if it [the U-2] was knocked down by a hostile [Soviet] action. . . . The whole cover story was built on the basis that the man would never survive.

McCone: I realize that, and I realized that at the time. But it was absolutely wrong. . . .

Eisenhower: I don't want to be accusing people of having fooled me. But I do know that they told me: ". . . You just don't have to worry, General. It is perfectly all right because there's nobody there." That's all.

actionary circles of the United States. . . . We regret that it has not achieved the results expected by all nations of the world. Let the disgrace and blame for this rest with those who have proclaimed a bandit policy toward the Soviet Union! . . .

"As everybody knows, President Eisenhower and I agreed to exchange visits. . . . We were planning to give a good welcome to this honored guest." But now the Soviet people could not receive him with proper cordiality. "On its part the Soviet government will continue to do its utmost to relax international tension and resolve problems that still divide us today."

The only sound in the room was the ticking of the gold clock at the center of the table.

Eisenhower said that Khrushchev had been misinformed. The American government had not threatened more overflights: "The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack. In point of fact these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. . . .

"I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for *all* forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference."

Looking stricken, Macmillan said: "I naturally deplore that after the long and painful ascent to the summit we now find this dark cloud upon us. I quite understand the feelings that have been aroused by this incident. But I would like to . . . make two points: First, what has happened has happened. Second, we all know that espionage . . . is a disagreeable fact of life and also that most forms of espionage involve violation of national sovereignty."

Macmillan noted that the President had made clear that overflights would not be resumed. "I am glad Mr. Khrushchev did not propose abandonment [of the summit] but postponement only. However, I would suggest to him, as the French proverb goes, "*Ce qui est déferé est perdu*" [What is postponed is lost]. A long delay after all our efforts . . . will itself bring great harm to the cause for which we have worked so hard."

By now de Gaulle was angry. He told Khrushchev: "Before you left Moscow and after the U-2 was shot down . . . you told my ambassador that this conference should be held and that it would be fruitful. . . . You have brought Mr. Macmillan here from London, General Eisenhower from the United States and have put me to serious inconvenience to organize and attend a meeting which your intransigence will make impossible. . . . It would not serve humanity to break up on the basis of a parochial incident." He proposed a day's re-

cess. Khrushchev shook his head. Eisenhower had not apologized for his "aggressive act." "We will allow no one—but *no one*—to violate our sovereignty!"

De Gaulle: "Yesterday that satellite you launched just before you left Moscow to impress us overflowed the sky of France 18 times without my permission. How do I know that you do not have cameras aboard which are taking pictures of my country?"

"Our latest sputnik has no cameras."

"Well, how did you take those pictures of the far side of the moon which you showed us with such justifiable pride?"

"In that one I had cameras."

"Ah, in *that* one you had cameras! Pray continue."

For the first time since their Camp David meeting eight months before, Khrushchev spoke directly to Eisenhower: "We don't un-

COVERT ACTION TO TRAP THE RUSSIANS?

Eisenhower and Macmillan were despondent over the failure of the Paris summit. They suspected that more trouble lay ahead—and they were right.


Back in Moscow, Khrushchev launched a massive anti-Western propaganda attack. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions," he told a Kremlin audience, "and that is where Eisenhower will land!"

At the United Nations, Andrei Gromyko denounced American "perfidy": Eisenhower's talk of improving relations before the U-2 flight had been like the Japanese

tion or regret for the insult made to us. . . . We don't want to aggravate relations. They require a great deal of improvement anyhow. But please understand that our internal politics requires this. It is a matter of honor." Bohlen was astonished by Khrushchev's reference to internal politics and thought it showed the severe pressure on him from inside the Kremlin.

"Please understand: How can I invite as a dear guest the leader of a country which has committed an aggressive act against us? . . . We are not prepared to come as poor relatives to beg NATO members for mercy and beg your leader not to violate our frontiers."

Macmillan said, "It would be desirable to fix a time for the meeting tomorrow because the press might think the conference has broken down, which it may." Khrushchev corrected him: "This is *not* the beginning of the conference. *That* has not started yet."



derstand what devil pushed you into doing this provocative act to us just before the summit. If there had been no incident, we would have come here in friendship and the best possible atmosphere." He raised his hands above his head: "As God is my witness I come with clean hands and a pure soul."

(Eisenhower later said that when he heard Khrushchev say this, he almost choked.)

De Gaulle: "There are many devils in the world, and it is the job of this conference to exorcise them."

Eisenhower: "I cannot speak for my successor—"

Khrushchev: "Nor am I eternal."

Eisenhower: "—and I do not know what decision the next President will make. However, the flights will not be resumed not only for the duration of the conference but for the entire duration of my term."

"For us that is not enough," said Khrushchev. "There is no reference to condemna-

envoys "smiling in Washington before Pearl Harbor."

Exactly two months after May Day the Soviets shot down an American RB-47 spy plane over the Barents Sea. Khrushchev tried to escalate the event into another U-2 affair.

By August, Eisenhower had had enough. Gordon Gray, his national-security adviser, privately suggested to him that the U.S. regain the offensive by covert action. Gray proposed a plan to humiliate Khrushchev. The U.S. could secretly lure a Soviet plane, submarine or trawler across American boundaries and then complain to the world of a Soviet border violation—"whether absolutely technically true or not," as Gray put it. But Eisenhower refused to authorize the trap.

It was 2:06 p.m. Khrushchev and his entourage marched downstairs to his limousine in the palace courtyard.

Upstairs Eisenhower exclaimed, "What kind of apology does that man *want*?" De Gaulle took him by the arm: "I do not know what Khrushchev is going to do or what is going to happen. But . . . I want you to know that I am with you to the end."

The President rode back to his residence and marched into the house: "You might have thought *we'd* done a Hungary!" He stomped about the living room: "I'm just *fed up*! I'm just *fed up*!" Khrushchev was nothing but a "son of a bitch" trying to impress the Kremlin—"completely intransigent and insulting to the United States." Had Khrushchev revoked the invitation to Russia? Fine. That only saved *him* the bother of turning it down himself!

Bohlen declared, "It was the coldest gathering of human beings I believe I've ever seen."

Tuesday morning, May 17. John Eisenhower walked into the President's sitting room just after 8 and found his father with Herter, Goodpastor and Press Secretary James Hagerty discussing tactics for the day. The President had not slept soundly.

Outside his residence Khrushchev announced, "Unless President Eisenhower apologizes and admits America made an aggressive action against the Soviet Union, I will return home."

At the Elysée at 10 the Western leaders resolved to send Khrushchev a written invitation to a 3 o'clock session. With several hours to kill, Eisenhower took Macmillan to see the château in Marnes-la-Coquette where he had lived as commander of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.

At 3 Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle and their aides sat down in the palace. De Gaulle

announced that at last report Khrushchev was "kissing babies on the street and electioneering for the French Communist Party."

Now Khrushchev was relaxing in a hot bath at the Soviet residence. At 3:20 one of his aides called the Elysée: If this was to be an actual summit meeting, Khrushchev would not attend unless his conditions were satisfied.

De Gaulle: "Tell him that it is the custom between *civilized* nations to respond to written communications by written communications."

With tears in his eyes Macmillan asked his colleagues to let him appeal to Khrushchev to return to the table. Two years of work for peace were about to collapse in "the worst crisis my country has experienced since the war." Eisenhower whispered to Herter, "You know, poor old Hal is very upset about this, and I think we might go as far as to meet him on this one point." Bohlen scribbled Herter a fierce note that emotional appeals were the wrong approach to use with Soviet leaders. De Gaulle thought the proposal "too Byzantine."

At 4:15 a written message arrived from Khrushchev: He would not attend unless his terms were met.

The three Western leaders wrote out a communiqué declaring the summit dead. Eisenhower returned to his residence. Someone asked if he had been concerned about Macmillan's emotional plea to press on after the summit had obviously failed. "Not at all," said the President. "I know Harold well, and that's just an act he puts on."

Wednesday, May 18. Thousands of reporters and other spectators packed into a sweltering hall at the Palais de Chaillot. Khrushchev walked on stage and clasped his hands over his head, provoking what someone called "the noise and violence of a quasi riot." Flanked by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Malinovsky, he stood behind a table and pounded it so hard that he toppled a bottle of mineral water:

"I have already been informed that [West German] Chancellor [Konrad] Adenauer sent here some of those Fascist bastards we didn't finish off at Stalingrad. We hit them so hard that we put them 10 feet underground right away. If you boo us and attack us again, *look out!* We will hit you so hard that there won't be a squeal out of you!"

The crowd leaped from seats, shrieked and shook fists. Someone shouted a question: Why hadn't Khrushchev asked Eisenhower at Camp David to halt the U-2 flights? "I will answer that question with pleasure. When I was talking at Camp David with President Eisenhower, I almost opened my mouth to make that statement. The atmosphere was so convivial, with the President telling me to call him 'my friend' in English and calling me '*moi drug*' in Russian—like a brother he was! It was then that I wanted to tell my friend that it was not nice to fly over a friend's territory without his permission.

AFTER THE CRISIS: IKE, KHRUSHCHEV, POWERS

The U-2 crisis ended bargaining on a limited nuclear-test ban. No accord was signed until 1963. What ensued were perhaps the darkest years of the cold war, culminating in the Cuban missile crisis.

Powers was subjected to a Moscow show trial. Khrushchev considered commuting the pilot's 10-year sentence but feared it might help

Eisenhower's party win the 1960 election. He later boasted that by keeping Powers he had cast "the deciding ballot" for John Kennedy.

In February, 1962, Powers was exchanged for

Soviet spy Rudolf Abel. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover opposed the trade: Abel was far more valuable, and it would be "catastrophic if the U.S. arranged for Powers's release and he then refused to come home."

Following his CIA debriefing, Powers joined Lockheed as a U-2 test pilot in California. In 1970 he was let go after writing a memoir, *Operation Overflight*, that displeased many U.S. intelligence officials. Unable to get a job in U.S. commercial aviation, he became a Los Angeles broadcast pilot and was killed when his helicopter crashed in August, 1977.

Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. He later said that his fall from power began with the U-2 downing on May Day, 1960. After that, he said, he had had to share power with Kremlin hard-liners.

Eisenhower told an aide in the summer of 1960 that he thought he was making "big progress" in curbing the cold war until the "stupid U-2 mess" ruined his efforts. Shortly before he died in 1969 he said: "I had longed to give the United States and the world a lasting peace. I was able only to contribute to a stalemate."



"But then I thought better of it and decided: 'No, I am not going to tell him. There is something stinky about this friend of mine.'" He waved his own fists: "To hear President Eisenhower it would seem that the question of whether U.S. military planes will or will not fly over the U.S.S.R. depends on him and him alone. Just think—*what presumption!* Now he says they will not overfly—*what magnanimity!* This is to be decided by us and us alone. . . . We shall deal shattering blows to the bases where they came from—and at those who set up the bases!"

At the American residence Eisenhower read the text of Khrushchev's harangue as it came over the ticker and cried, "Incredible! Unbelievable!" At his embassy Macmillan did the same and thought it "reminiscent of Hitler at his worst."

"It's a tragedy, a real tragedy," said a Soviet diplomat, adjourning with a British reporter to a café. "I was in Moscow just a few days ago. Everybody was rushing to Gorky Park to see the 'new American exhibition,' the remnants of the spy plane. . . . Khrushchev had been telling them that there were warmongers and cold-war maniacs in America, but he trusted Eisenhower. . . ."

"Now everything has changed. He has come to the conclusion that Eisenhower may be a good man, for all he knows, but hopelessly weak and helpless and dominated by the CIA. . . . What the Americans proclaimed by refusing to make even the most routine apologies to us was that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian country whose sovereignty it was not necessary to respect. . . ."

"And to think that only a fortnight ago they were preparing to give Eisenhower a more tremendous reception—and a perfectly genuine one—than our country had ever given to any foreign statesman from either West or East. It was that which those Pentagon and Allen Dulles bastards were afraid of."

Friday afternoon, May 20. As the President walked down the ramp from "Air Force One" he saw Mamie with tears in her eyes. He averted his glance and blinked hard, himself on the verge of tears. Someone wrote, "This had been the biggest disappointment of his life, and he made no attempt to hide it."

The band played, the crowd cheered. Fireboats sprayed greeting as the open black car crossed the Potomac. Two hundred thousand Americans lined the route. On Pennsylvania Avenue, he passed under a great banner which said: "THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT."

The car rolled to a stop beneath the north portico of the White House. Eisenhower turned toward the throngs pressing against the black iron fence and thrust both arms into the air as he had done long ago while riding down Broadway after victory in Europe. Then he disappeared into the mansion. ■



'Ah, it may be this martini speaking, but I sense a small technical rebound.'

HAMILTON FOR CHRONICLE FEATURES

BUSINESS BRIEFING

American companies get a rise from the dollar's fall

Exporters watched overseas markets dry up during 1980-85 as the dollar's value against other currencies climbed. Now, with the dollar down 30 percent from its peak and at a postwar low against the Japanese yen, these companies are beginning to reap benefits.

Fourteen months ago, General Electric lost a \$350 million contract to Mitsubishi for a gas-turbine project in Saudi Arabia. Late in 1985, against the same competition, GE won a \$71 million contract to supply turbines to Pakistan. Chairman Jack Welch says a weaker dollar and a stronger trade policy present the U.S. with "a real chance to win again in world markets."

Hewlett-Packard's international orders shot up 28 percent, to a record \$805 million, in the November-January quarter. The pickup began immediately after the U.S. and its major economic partners began exerting downward pressure on the dollar last fall. Potlatch, the forest-products firm, has seen overseas business strengthen in recent weeks. Its export shipments had dropped sharply in 1984 and 1985.

Domestically, a weaker dollar is

helping American manufacturers compete against imports. The frequency of price hikes on Japanese cars leaves Detroit in an enviable position. Says President Tetsuo Chino of American Honda: "If we keep raising prices like this, we won't sell all the cars we bring in under import quotas." Honda's Accord LX, up 17 percent in price from 1985, now costs 42 percent more than the competing Ford Tempo LX.

The impact of currency changes remains uneven. Sony is forsaking profits to maintain its U.S. market share—earnings fell 22 percent during November-January even as sales rose 8 percent. Grain exports remain depressed, with U.S. wheat priced 50 percent above European grain. Deere & Company doesn't expect a pickup in export orders for its farm and industrial equip-


ment before next year. Still, events unfolding today present U.S. exporters with opportunities they haven't had in years.

■ Up in the air over fares

The collapse in oil prices should save airlines \$2.5 billion a year on fuel (Salomon Brothers), \$2.9 billion (First Boston) or \$3.5 billion (Airline Economics). The ultimate number may be immaterial, because carriers risk competing it all away in fare-cutting bouts that continue unabated.

How low is low? People Express on March 17 announced a \$49 one-way fare from Newark to eight Florida cities, with some restrictions. Despite a 22 percent jump in passenger miles in February and high load factors, American Airlines expects to lose money in the first quarter. So does United. Price wars in Denver are such that some travel agents charge travelers \$10 to write cheap tickets. "I was making \$3.90 on \$39 fares and losing money," complains President Betty Wilcox of Personalized Travel Service there.

Fare cuts to fill seats have become a ritual during the slow winter months. The industry expects that, come spring, traffic will rise, empty seats will disappear and fares will firm. President Harold Pareti of Presidential Airways says that, once carriers realize the extent of









Maj Vince Mozza

555 MPH - 1949

42,300 - 1950

Lt Col J. P. Stapp

TRACKS AT

633 MPH

4 UP TO 45 g.

Human Factors Symposium June 1956
Congress Hotel - Chicago

Mockup of Stanley Aerobics Corp (Denver) pilot, canopy, escape
Capsule on Lockwood. Designed around XF-102 & already

dropped.

B. Gen. Marvin Demler
Vince Mozza

Trip with Lt Col C. C. Cain
Maj Ed Ballinger - MC

Lt Lee Bridgeman

Lt Mandigo

Col John Talbot

Col Phil Witzel
and others

OFFICIAL AIR FORCE PHOTO

6590th Hq Spt Gp ARDC
Baltimore, Maryland





classification - reclassified
authority - CG WAO
degraded by - E. S. Sperry
JLT WJAP
date 8 Nov. 1953

copy
sent to
JLT



2 4048

not able to
get out of harness
still trapped to dugs
Holl of a hole
Tried to chew
85 ropes "forget knife"

Lake St Clair Mich
Sept 3, 1952

Col. Sommer
Lt. Anderson
1st Lt. Quisenberry
1st Lt. Potts
5,000 - 125 ft
5 miles deep

SEPT 5 1952

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United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 23, 1986

Edward G. Sperry
Col. USAF (Ret.)
5775 East Side Highway
Stevensville, Montana 59870

Dear Col. Sperry:


Thank you for your recent letter concerning the unfortunate Challenger incident. I appreciate your taking the time to bring your concerns to my attention. I found your letter most interesting.

In effort to assist you, I have forwarded your letter to the appropriate official at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. As soon as I receive a response, I will be back in touch with you.

In the meantime, if you have any further information or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

With best personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



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(406) 586-6104

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(406) 782-8700

GREAT FALLS
(406) 761-1574

HELENA
(406) 449-5480

MISSOULA
(406) 329-3123



National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Washington, D.C.
20546

Reply to Attn of: C:MKK:C19593;A62034f

AUG 18 1986

Honorable Max Baucus
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Baucus:

This letter responds to your inquiry of June 23, 1986, to Administrator James C. Fletcher on behalf of Mr. Edward G. Sperry who expressed concern about the lack of an escape system in the design of the space shuttle.

The decision was made early in the development of the space shuttle to remove crew ejection seat capability after the orbital test flights in order to accommodate the larger crews required for the operational flight program. The ejection seats were derivations of the high altitude SR-71 (reconnaissance aircraft) seats, and were very heavy and bulky. No more than two astronauts would physically fit on the orbiter flight deck. The decision to remove the seats was based on the premise that the first four test flights were sufficient to prove safety and reliability of the space shuttle systems, including the solid rocket boosters. It was also based on the basic space shuttle design philosophy which was to design out all possible failure modes which would result in an ejection situation.

It should be noted that the ejection seats had problems of their own. There were over one hundred life threatening failure modes resident in the ejection system as installed in the Space Shuttle Columbia (including uncommanded rocket detonation, and premature overhead hatch jettison.) Further, the envelope of the ejection seats was limited to post launch (no on pad abort capability) through 100,000 feet. The solid rockets burn for another 25 seconds above 100,000 feet. Moreover, there was serious concern about ejection through the main engine plume with possible injury to crew or damage to parachutes.

The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident did an in depth review of the history of crew escape in the space shuttle program. They concluded that no known escape system could have saved the Challenger crew; however, they did recommend that NASA "make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight."

Before the Commission report was published, the National Space Transportation System program manager at the Johnson Space Center initiated a thorough review of the entire range of crew egress and escape options. A team was formed consisting of NASA engineers, industry, and military experts (including the crew experts from the Air Force Aeronautical Laboratories in Ohio). On June 30 of this year, the team finished a two month conceptual study which picked up where previous shuttle escape studies left off in examining state of the art systems.


As a result of the escape team study, the shuttle program manager has issued instructions to the Kennedy Space Center to improve their ground egress systems and procedures and to the Orbiter Project Office to work with the prime orbiter contractor (Rockwell International) on a more detailed study of a variety of escape options. Included are manual and rocket assisted bailout, rocket extraction, ejection seats and ejection pods. These studies will define cost and schedule impacts for each concept and will be used to help the shuttle program manager decide what sort of egress/escape system will be implemented before the next flight, as well as the longer term.

Additionally, reviews are currently underway in the areas of shuttle hardware concerns, intact abort capabilities (those emergencies where the orbiter can be flown safely to an abort landing field), and potential enhancements. The obvious intent of all these reviews is to determine those changes which can be implemented in the interest of decreasing the probability of failures which might require crew escape prior to loss of vehicle control or ditching.

In summary, Mr. Sperry's concern for crew safety is shared by NASA, and a significant effort is currently underway both to decrease the probability of catastrophic failures which would require escape and to provide the crew with some reasonable means to safely leave the vehicle should a non-intact abort emergency arise.

Please let us know when we may be of further assistance to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John F. Murphy". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a stylized "M".

John F. Murphy
Assistant Administrator
for Legislative Affairs

10 June 1986

The Honorable Max Baucus
U.S. Senate
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Baucus;

Recent news releases concerning recovery of major portions of the Challenger's crew compartment compel me to write. Perhaps my comments will assist you in evaluating the recommendations which will be forthcoming concerning both the Shuttle Program and future space efforts.

Like so many citizens, the loss of the Challenger's crew was sorrowing. Perhaps more so in my instance as I am aware that the crew did not have to die. Escape from high altitudes is both possible and feasible.

Please allow me to briefly comment about high altitude escape as it is a field in which I worked for many years.

I am a retired USAF Colonel. Early in my career I tested ejection seats at high speeds and high altitudes. Our intent at that time was to develop escape systems for use at any speed or altitudes an aircraft reached.

The technology to escape from "9 miles up" has existed since the 1950's! I personally ejected from a B-47 at 46,000'. We made numerous dummy tests from beneath balloons at altitudes up to 100,000'. Finally as part of the same program Joe Kittinger descended by parachute from a balloon at 102,000'. These statements are professionally documented in Air Force technical archives. The following are two examples; (1) WADC TECH RPT 57-477 Part 1 ASTIA DOCUMENT No. 130965 "High Altitude Balloon Dummy Drops" Oct. 1957.

(2) WADC TECH NOTE 55-239 ASTIA DOCUMENT No. AD 118053 "DOWNWARD EJECTION FLIGHT TEST OF A SHOCK-ABSORBING SEAT FIRING CONTROL SYSTEM", Feb. 1957.

The decision not to provide an escape system for the shuttles' initial phase of flight was based on consideration of three economies and one

'convenience'. The economies were: (a) to save money (b) to save weight, and (c) to save complexity. The convenience was to enable the crew to conduct the entire flight in a "shirtsleeves" environment.

At the time these design decisions were made all escape systems development had become dedicated to low altitude escape. The incidents of ejection were far more prevalent in the take off and landing portion of aircraft flight envelopes. Interest in high altitude escape, the technology of altitude escape, which would have applied to the shuttle, was dropped. Leading advocates in abridging such research were the operational commands and the Air Force Flight Safety Directorate.

Please don't let it be decided that the crew was unlikely to survive because of high altitude. Tests have clearly shown that the chances of survival at altitudes up to at least 100,000' are excellent. I cannot, of course address the explosion; yet, people have been recovered from many terrible exposures as long as the surrounding structure kept it's integrity. For one famous example, consider Gary Powers, surviving after his U-2 was hit by a Russian rocket.

In conclusion, there was an excellent chance of the Challenger's crew to survive. However, the design of the shuttle did not provide for escape during boost. This was a deliberate and perhaps logical choice. However, in consideration of future programs let's admit the choice was made. Let's also deliberately reconsider whether or not to make provisions for escape.

Sincerely yours,



Edward G. Sperry
Col. USAF (Ret.)

DOE review pinpoints Hanford C1

Cougars improve to 7-3 D1

THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW

Spokane Chronicle



SUNDAY

POISON
PESTICIDES
POSE HARM
TO HUNTERS
AND HUNTED

Outdoors, D10

REGIONAL EDITION

NOV. 13, 1988
VOLUME 4, NO. 12

Coverup of Challenger deaths alleged

Seven astronauts may have survived explosion, died on impact with ocean

Knight-Ridder

NASA officials misled employees, a presidential commission and the public about whether seven astronauts could have survived the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, the Miami Herald reported today.

"There are some major horror stories about the way they tried to cover up the whole thing," the newspaper quoted Robert B. Hotz as saying. "There are a lot of unanswered questions." Hotz was a mem-

ber of the presidential commission that investigated the accident.

The official NASA account was that the astronauts were killed instantly in the explosion of the shuttle soon after takeoff from Cape Canaveral on Jan. 28, 1986.

Actually, most of the crew were probably conscious and aware of their fate for the 2½ minutes it took to fall to the sea, the newspaper said.

The condition of salvaged parts indicated the shuttle's crew compartment sur-

vived the explosion intact, and there was no clear evidence the cabin even depressurized.

At least three of the astronauts were able to turn on emergency air supplies after the blast.

The crew compartment broke apart when it hit the ocean at 200 mph, dismembering the astronauts' bodies.

"If it had landed softly," the Herald quoted an investigator as saying, "they could have swam home."

National Aeronautics and Space Administration spokesman Shirley Green said there had been no cover-up, and no attempt at cover-up.

NASA refused to comment on the Challenger accident itself, and top officials

refused to be interviewed. In researching the article, free-lance writer Dennis E. Powell interviewed former NASA officials, astronauts, Coast Guard and Navy officers, military and civilian medical authorities, a congressman, and members of the presidential commission that investigated the accident.

Among his findings:

■ To prevent the Brevard County medical examiner from performing autopsies, as was required by law, the bodies of three astronauts were moved to a military base where local officials had no jurisdiction. The bodies were recovered from the ocean and taken to Port Canaveral, then transferred to Patrick Air Force Base, 25 miles away.

To avoid calling attention to the move, the remains were carried in 30-gallon plastic garbage cans in the back of a single open-bed U.S. Navy pickup truck. When the Navy brought remains of other astronauts into port in aluminum coffins draped with American flags, and greeted them with salutes, NASA officials complained it was establishing "too high a profile."

■ Mention of the space shuttle had been deleted from President Reagan's State of the Union Message, which he was to deliver the evening of the launch on Jan. 28, 1986. NASA lobbied the White House to get the space program back into the speech, and that eagerness may have translated to

(See Shuttle on page 2)

'We're looking for tremendous changes'



Afghan rebels block key road

Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Afghan guerrillas claimed Saturday they cut the strategic Salang Highway between the capital, Kabul, and the Soviet Union in an offensive

carriers and trucks.

He did not elaborate on casualty figures.

Last week, Jamiat leader Burhanuddin Rabbani discussed the Salang offensive with associates in



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ATTN: LT McANDREW